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Abstract  
Prior research shows that firms benefit from the social capital of their boards of directors 
but has not explored the antecedents of new director social capital. We argue that firms 
can attract directors with social capital by offering more compensation. We also argue that 
more complex firms (firms with a greater scale and scope of operations) are more attractive 
to such directors because of the greater experience and exposure that such directorships 
provide. Similarly, we argue that firms with high-status directors on their current boards 
will be more attractive to directors with social capital. We analyze the social capital of new 
outside directors added to boards of semiconductor firms between 1993 and 2007. Surpris-
ingly, we find no support for the hypothesis that higher compensation is associated with 
adding directors with high status or board ties. However, firm complexity is associated with 
the ability to add new directors who have social capital, and the status of current board 
members is associated with the ability to add new directors who also have high status.  
Introduction 
There is general consensus that board members can both benefit and harm the firms for 
which they serve as directors (Hillman et al., 2000; Payne et al., 2009; Ruigrok et al., 2006). 
One of the most valuable attributes that a director can bring to a board is social capi-
tal (D’Aveni, 1990; Hillman, 2005; Stevenson and Radin, 2009). However, prior research 
mostly treats board social capital as exogenous and therefore does not explore the ques-
tion of why directors with these valuable attributes end up on the boards of some firms 
and not others. This literature does not address the issue of whether all firms have the 
same opportunity or inclination to add new directors with social capital. Understanding 
the antecedents of new director social capital is a first step towards advancing governance 
theory by putting studies of director social capital in context (Hambrick et al., 2008). 
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Within corporate governance research, two distinct dimensions of social capital have 
been investigated. The first builds on resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978) and focuses on board members’ ties to other organizations. The second type of so-
cial capital builds on the notion of status, which is conceptualized as unearned ascrip-
tion of social rank (Washington and Zajac, 2005). While all current and potential directors 
are members of an elite group ( Jensen and Zajac, 2004), there are still differences in so-
cial capital among directors. In the case of ties to organizations, some directors may serve 
on only one board, for example, while other directors may serve on several. With regard to 
status, some board members may have achieved high status in the arenas of military, gov-
ernment, or business while others have not (D’Aveni, 1990). 
Social capital researchers in the context of governance argue that directors with high so-
cial capital can bring information about the external environment, other firms’ strategies, 
and prospective managerial talent (Certo, 2003; Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993). Empiri-
cal research in this area demonstrates the consistent positive impact of high social capital. 
For example, directors who serve in a political capacity while also on the board improve 
firm value (Hillman et al., 1999). Firms with more ex-politicians on the board perform bet-
ter than firms with fewer or none, especially in regulated industries (Hillman, 2005), and 
social capital on the board can help firms avoid bankruptcy (D’Aveni, 1990). Additionally, 
directors of acquisition targets who serve on multiple corporate boards improve perfor-
mance (Keys and Li, 2005). Since directors with high social capital benefit the firm by serv-
ing on the board, they are likely to be sought after by multiple firms (Kim and Cannella, 
2008). Our question then is: what are the antecedents of a firm’s ability to add new direc-
tors with high social capital? 
Theories of resource dependence and social status explain how directors with social 
capital can benefit the firms that they serve, but these theories do not explain why some 
boards have more director social capital than others. A new director who joins a board 
has to be first invited and then must agree to accept the invitation. The needs of the firm 
and the social connections of current board members will influence who is invited to join 
the board. The attractiveness of the firm will influence who will accept the invitations. Di-
rectors, just like managers, are at least partially motivated by self-interest. We argue that 
three primary factors are associated with a new director’s social capital: compensation, the 
reputational benefits of being associated with a firm, and the social benefits of being asso-
ciated with the other directors on the board. We extend governance research by exploring 
the antecedents to new director social capital, and we extend governance theory by intro-
ducing the notion that attributes of the firm and its board influence the types of directors 
that join the board in the future. We also add some clarity to the study of board social cap-
ital by distinguishing between the social capital on the board as a whole and that of indi-
vidual directors. 
We investigate what influences potential directors to join a board by analyzing pub-
licly held semiconductor firms that added outside directors between 1993 and 2007. In our 
sample, 106 unique firms added a total of 336 new directors. We find that firm complexity 
(i.e. the scale and scope of the firm) is positively associated with the number of board ties 
and the status of new directors. Furthermore, the status of the current board is positively 
associated with new directors who have high status. We were surprised to find that board 
member compensation appears to have no effect on the social capital that firms are able to 
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attract to their boards. Part of building a better understanding of board  processes and ef-
fectiveness is discerning the antecedents of board social capital (Hambrick et al., 2008), 
and that is the motivation of this study. 
Theory and hypotheses 
Before we present our hypotheses, we first explain why high social capital is valuable on 
the board and next explain how new directors are selected. We then focus on why firms 
differ in the social capital of new directors added to their boards. 
Social Capital on the Board 
Social capital refers to a person’s socially valuable personal attributes and network 
connections (Lester et al., 2008; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). These attributes and con-
nections benefit the firm (Haunschild, 1993; Lester et al., 2008; Payne et al., 2009). A 
closer look at the theories underlying board social capital reveals two very different 
types, or dimensions, of social capital that can benefit the firm – ties to external organi-
zations and high status, or prestige. These dimensions of social capital dominate the re-
search in this area. Most previous research treats the board as a single entity; and we see 
that boards collectively pool the capital of their members in the advice, counsel, provi-
sion of resources, and monitoring that they do (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009). How-
ever, we also see that individual directors vary with regard to the number of ties and the 
prestige that they possess. 
One type of board social capital explored in the governance literature is ties to ex-
ternal organizations. The benefits that external ties can bring a firm are grounded in 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Proponents of resource de-
pendence theory argue that organizational survival is dependent on the ability to ac-
cess critical resources from the environment (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Firms actively manage their resource environments by maintaining ex-
ternal linkages to organizations on which they depend for critical resources (Hillman, 
2005; Westphal et al., 2006). Board co-optation – adding a representative of a criti-
cal resource to the board – constitutes one method of managing this dependence and 
benefiting the firm. Co-optation refers to the notion that once appointed to a board, 
the directors will support, identify with, and work to assist the firm (Hillman and Dal-
ziel, 2003). Ultimately, these ties can impact firm performance (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998). Furthermore, boards with directors who have ties to relevant organizations are 
able to provide better advice and counsel (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). Previous work 
shows that ties, or interlocks, to other firms are associated with positive benefits such as 
strengthening the firm’s linkages with the environment by facilitating relationships with 
other firms (Boyd, 1990) and improving the terms of acquisition if the firm becomes an 
acquisition target (Keys and Li, 2005). 
Individual directors may sit on more than one board. The improvement in quality of 
advice and counsel comes from an improvement in the information resources that mul-
tiple board memberships bring (Zhang, 2008). An associated reason that ties bring bene-
fits to the firm follows a network logic (Stevenson and Radin, 2009). In the network litera-
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ture, the number of ties that a person has to others is a measure of degree centrality.  Ties 
can benefit the firm through increased connectivity and embeddedness (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998). Embeddedness in both resource and information networks on the part of 
directors facilitates their ability to advise and counsel management as well as their abil-
ity to acquire resources for the firm (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009). In sum, the greater 
the number of ties a director has to other firms, the greater the informational and network 
benefits for the firm. 
Another type of board social capital explored in the governance literature is prestige or 
high status. Status is a function of an individual’s personal associations and achievements. 
Directors with high status benefit the firm by influencing the perceptions of those outside 
the firm (D’Aveni, 1990). Directors who have attained membership in elite circles benefit 
the firm because a board’s prestige signals the legitimacy of the firm. A board with pres-
tigious directors is sending a signal to potential investors and trading partners that it is a 
legitimate and valuable entity (Certo, 2003). The status perspective suggests that organi-
zations benefit simply by being associated with those who have attained high status (Ba-
zerman and Schoorman, 1983; Washington and Zajac, 2005). High-status directors on a 
company’s board are positively associated with better performance at its initial public of-
fering (IPO) (Certo et al., 2001). Thus the prestige of the directors can positively impact 
the perception of firm value. 
At the board level, board ties and high status – two key types of social capital – are of-
ten measured as a single construct (Belliveau et al., 1996; Certo et al., 2001; D’Aveni, 1990). 
While it is true that these two types of social capital are often found on the same boards, it 
is not the case that both forms of social capital are always attached to the same individu-
als. A quick read of company proxy statements will reveal many individuals with high sta-
tus (e.g. university presidents, former generals) who serve on only one board. On the other 
hand, there are many professional directors who serve on multiple boards but would not 
be classified as individuals with high status. For this reason, we distinguish board ties and 
high status as two separate forms of social capital. 
The Process of Director Selection 
According to the National Association of Corporate Directors, the typical relationship 
between the board and board candidates is initiated by the board. Replacing or recruit-
ing a new director is a delicate process, and confidentiality for all involved parties at all 
points in the process is critical. The company’s nominating committee identifies prospec-
tive directors in one of two primary ways: through current board member recommenda-
tions or through a hired executive search firm. The nominating committee puts names for-
ward, and potential candidates are selected for interviews. Potential candidates may agree 
to be considered for the board, or they may decline. If potential directors agree, then they 
are added to the proxy statement for shareholder ratification. Although nominated direc-
tors must be formally approved by shareholders at the annual meeting, the shareholders 
almost always approve the nominations. No announcement or press release accompanies a 
director search. Only the final selection is announced, and there are no announcements of 
those who decline an invitation to join a board.  
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Since being a director is a prestigious job that provides valuable learning opportunities 
(Useem, 1982), a large pool of people is willing to serve on boards. Although the passage of 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) has increased the time commitment and potential finan-
cial risks of serving on a board, over 80 per cent of directors are willing to consider serving 
on an additional board in order to gain ‘affiliation with highly respected companies and 
other directors, exposure to other governance processes and the opportunity to gain new 
ideas’ (Neff and Heidrick, 2006, p. 1). Additionally, serving as a director enhances an exec-
utive’s leadership skills and visibility (Lublin, 2010). Many firms want to have ‘outside di-
rectors who are distinguished individuals who also have an ability to add value as directors’ 
(Adams et al., 2008, p. 32), so candidates for directorships with greater social capital are 
more likely to be selected as board members (Kim and Cannella, 2008). A firm can iden-
tify and invite a new director with high social capital to serve on the board, but convincing 
that valuable individual to accept the invitation will be determined in large part by how 
the potential director believes he or she will personally benefit from serving on the board. 
Thus, to understand how directors with social capital end up on certain boards, we 
need to understand what factors influence firms to seek directors with social capital and 
what factors make directors with social capital more likely to accept an invitation to join 
a board. As there is little previous work that directly addresses the question of how direc-
tors choose their boards, we draw from work that explores what motivates existing direc-
tors. Theoretical work on director behavior identifies compensation and reputation as two 
primary motivators (e.g. Fich and Shivdasani, 2005; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Yermack, 
2004). These scholars attempt to explain how the motivations of directors influence their 
behavior in the boardroom. They do not address the question of why a director initially 
joins a board. We theorize that what influences director behavior in the boardroom will 
also influence a potential director to join a board. 
Compensation. Compared to the number of studies on executive compensation, there 
are relatively few studies of board compensation; and most of this research focuses on the 
drivers of board compensation rather than the effects of compensation on director behav-
ior. Firm and board size are found to be positively associated with higher board compen-
sation (Boyd, 1996; Linn and Park, 2005; Tufano and Sevick, 1997), and boards that have 
more directors from outside the company are awarded more equity-based compensation 
(Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). In addition, firms with greater agency problems use more con-
tingent compensation (Bryan and Klein, 2004; Vafeas, 1999). Finally, the amount of work 
required by a particular board is positively associated with director compensation (Hem-
pel and Fay, 1994). 
There is, however, some empirical evidence that directors respond to financial incen-
tives. Directors receive significant performance-based compensation that helps align the 
directors’ incentives with shareholders and positively impacts firm value ( Fich and Shiv-
dasani, 2005; Yermack, 2004). Even relatively small sums of money can influence direc-
tor behavior. For example, meeting fees (which are often $1000 or less) increase directors’ 
attendance (Adams and Ferreira, 2008). These studies highlight that compensation in-
fluences directors’ decision making. It follows that compensation could also influence a 
potential director’s decision to join a board. Indeed, if $1000 can influence  a director to at-
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tend a meeting, an annual retainer and stock options worth tens or hundreds of thousands 
of dollars may influence a potential director to join a board. Therefore, greater compen-
sation may influence potential directors who have greater social capital (ties or status) to 
agree to serve on that board. Thus, we hypothesize the following. 
Hypothesis 1a: Board member compensation is positively associated with the 
number of board ties a new director has. 
Hypothesis 1b: Board member compensation is positively associated with the 
status of a new director. 
Status of current directors. In addition to compensation, an important benefit of serv-
ing on a board is being associated with the other individuals on that board. Individuals 
tend to be attracted to organizations composed of people with similar social characteris-
tics (Ashforth and Mael, 1989), and this is especially true of individuals from high-status 
groups (Levin et al., 2002). Though all board members are to some extent corporate elites 
( Jensen and Zajac, 2004), research shows that directors are sensitive to differences in sta-
tus. For example, Belliveau et al. (1996) demonstrate that social status differences among 
board members are salient in board decisions about CEO compensation, indicating that 
board decisions are swayed by higher status directors. Since directors are sensitive to sta-
tus when making decisions, we also expect directors to be sensitive to status when ex-
tending invitations to potential new directors and we expect potential new directors to be 
sensitive to status when considering these invitations. Following the logic of Levin et al. 
(2002), a board composed of more high-status individuals will be more interested in add-
ing new directors who have high status. Furthermore, such a board will have more rela-
tionships with people who have high status, so it will have a larger pool of directors with 
high social capital from which to recruit. When considering whether to serve on a board, 
a potential director will assess the status of the other directors serving on that board. A 
board with a greater number of high-status directors offers two advantages to a potential 
director: the advantage of being associated with the firm and the advantage of being as-
sociated with the existing directors of the firm. Since high-status individuals would be 
unwilling to risk their reputations, the existing presence of high-status individuals on a 
board signals high firm quality (Certo, 2003; Miller and Triana, 2009). Also, a potential 
director will have the opportunity to work closely with high-status people. A board with 
more high-status directors will more actively seek out new directors with social capital 
and will be more attractive to potential directors who have high social capital. Thus, we 
hypothesize the following. 
Hypothesis 2a: The status of current board members is positively associated with 
the number of board ties a new director possesses. 
Hypothesis 2b: The status of current board members is positively associated with 
the status of a new director.  
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Firm complexity. Perhaps one reason for the limited number of studies on board com-
pensation is the belief that at least some outside directors ‘aren’t in it for the money’ 
(Black et al., 2006, p. 48). In fact, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that boards function best 
when director compensation is small because directors do not serve on boards primarily 
for monetary compensation. Early work in agency theory argued that directors serve on 
boards to establish their reputations as monitoring specialists and decision-control ex-
perts (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). So, in addition to financial incentives, direc-
tors can benefit from service on a board by enhancing their reputations and prestige and 
growing their networks (Fich and Shivdasani, 2005). Serving on a board can also enhance 
directors’ career opportunities and improve their chances to serve on other boards in the 
future ( Yermack, 2004). Indeed, ‘[d]irectors’ reputations would seem particularly impor-
tant in the market for directorships. A strong reputation presumably aids in getting more 
board seats or retaining the ones already held; a weak reputation the opposite’ (Adams et 
al., 2008, p. 42). 
A firm’s operational complexity is defined by its scale (revenue, assets, and employees) 
as well as its scope (number of different lines of business). There are two reasons that the 
reputational benefits of serving on a board increase with the complexity of the firm. First, 
complexity increases the difficulty of the board’s role because of higher levels of informa-
tion asymmetry (Sanders and Carpenter, 2003). In particular, larger firms have more sig-
nificant agency problems (Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al., 2008), and their boards of di-
rectors must work harder to monitor management to assess whether the decisions that 
are being made are aligned with the interests of the shareholders ( Jacobides and Croson, 
2001). Directors who take on these more difficult jobs can establish their reputations as de-
cision control experts and will ‘be perceived [by others] as more skilled because of the size 
and complexity of the operations they oversee’ (Ferris et al., 2003, p. 1089). 
Second, directors gain the reputation of decision control experts (Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983) only if they are noticed in the job. That is, directors have to be visible to peers 
and other firms. More complex firms are more visible in the marketplace because of their 
size and wider contracting environment (Ferris et al., 2003). Complex firms have a greater 
number of buyers, suppliers, and partners that result in increased external exposure. For 
the directors, this exposure affords them an opportunity to build their own reputations. 
These two attributes of more complex firms – they are more difficult to monitor and 
have a wider contracting environment – may also cause them to actively seek new direc-
tors who have proven themselves by serving on other boards. Thus, we expect more com-
plex firms to more actively seek new directors with high status or with experience on other 
boards, and we expect such directors to be more interested in serving on the boards of a 
more complex firms. Therefore, we hypothesize the following.
 
Hypothesis 3a: Firm complexity is positively associated with the number of 
board ties a new director has. 
Hypothesis 3b: Firm complexity is positively associated with the status of a new 
director.  
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Sample and methods 
Sample 
In order to test our hypotheses, we analyzed new directors who join the boards of firms 
in a single industry – semiconductors and related devices (SIC = 3674). While a single-in-
dustry sample limited our ability to generalize our results, it does have some advantages. 
The firms within the sample are similar, so it is more plausible that a new board member 
added to one firm in the sample could be a candidate for the board of another firm in the 
sample. Second, a single-industry research design controls for the fact that firms in differ-
ent industries may value status (or different types of status) differently. For example, Hill-
man (2005) finds that firms in regulated industries have more politicians on their boards 
and benefit more when they have them. 
We gathered our data from two different time periods. We originally chose to study the 
semiconductor industry in the years between 1993 and 2000 to take advantage of the fact 
that rapid industry growth led most firms in the industry to add new outside directors to 
their boards. Two years after the end of this time period, SOX went into effect. This law in-
creased the responsibilities and potential legal liabilities of outside board members and 
also required that directors, especially audit committee members, have more expertise. 
While we did not expect SOX to directly affect the mechanisms of board social capital, 
we wanted to ensure that the study findings were generalizable to the post-SOX era. So we 
gathered an additional sample of outside directors who were added to boards in the years 
between 2002 and 2007. 
We generated the first sample for the years between 1993 and 2000 by identifying all the 
firms in the Compustat database that are classified with semiconductors and related de-
vices (SIC = 3674) as their primary industry. We eliminated firms that are not traded on a 
major stock exchange, that are not incorporated in the United States, or that have miss-
ing financial data. For each firm, we searched EDGAR, Lexis-Nexis, and Laser D for proxy 
statements or 10 K reports that correspond to the appropriate fiscal years. The earliest 
proxy statements were obtained through Laser D since this was before the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) requirement for electronic filing of proxy statements. Later 
proxy statements were obtained through the SEC EDGAR database. These proxy state-
ments were the source of information about directors’ backgrounds and director compen-
sation. Some firms are included in Compustat before their stock is publicly traded or af-
ter they have been delisted from an exchange, so the SEC documents are not available for 
them. We excluded these firms from our sample. Within the time period of our first sam-
ple, 232 new outside directors were added to the boards of 91 unique firms. The gathering 
of additional data was facilitated by the introduction of new databases of corporate direc-
tors. We generated the second sample using the Corporate Library and Investor Respon-
sibility Research Center databases to identify new outside directors added to semicon-
ductor company boards after the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 through 
the 2007 fiscal year. Significantly fewer outside directors were added in this time period 
due to industry consolidation that has reduced the number of firms in the industry and 
slower growth that has reduced the need for new directors. In this period, 104 new out-
side directors were added to the boards of 49 unique firms. We obtained the proxy state-
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ments corresponding to the years that these directors were added  and coded information 
about director compensation and the social capital of current and new board members. 
The combined sample has 336 new outside directors added to 106 unique firms. 
Measures 
Dependent variables. Our hypotheses concern two forms of possible new director so-
cial capital. Board Ties is the total number of other boards on which the new board mem-
ber serves. Measuring status was much more difficult. Early research on board prestige 
combines measures of board interlocks with the social status of directors. For example, 
D’Aveni (1990) measures board prestige by looking at board interlocks as well as member-
ship in the political, military, or educational elite. He operationalizes the experience com-
ponent of top management prestige using information in the Dunn and Bradstreet Direc-
tory of Corporate Management, but this eliminates many potential firms from his sample 
because the directory focuses on larger firms. We used similar criteria to identify direc-
tor status but relied on legally required disclosure of biographical information in annual 
proxy statements. Status can be achieved in a number of different arenas, so we looked at 
work experience that indicates any of five different types of status. Each of these five types 
of status corresponds to measures of prestige used by D’Aveni (1990). The dean of a college 
or president of a university has high academic status. The CEO of a firm has high busi-
ness status. A general or admiral has high military status. Board members have high politi-
cal status if they have previously held state- or national-level political offices. Board mem-
bers have high social status if they have prominent roles in the community such as serving 
on notable not-for-profit boards (e.g. opera, museum). These represent the coding rules 
for whether a director has high status. Two coders identified status by reading each direc-
tor’s biographical statement and applying these decision rules. The coders agreed on sta-
tus (high or not) and type of status (academic, military, political, business, social) of direc-
tors 97.7 per cent of the time. We treated all types of status as coequal as previous research 
has done little to articulate whether some types of status are more valuable than others. 
We address this point in more detail in the discussion section. Status is a binary variable 
indicating that the new director has achieved status in one or more of these areas.
 
Independent variables. Outside directors receive cash compensation in two primary 
ways: flat pay (annual fee) and contingent pay (options or stock). For the flat pay compo-
nent, some firms offer an annual retainer of a fixed amount and other firms pay directors 
for each meeting attended. Some firms pay both a retainer and a fee per meeting attended. 
Flat Pay was determined by multiplying the meeting fee by the number of meetings per 
year and then adding the annual retainer. A number of firms also pay additional amounts 
for committee memberships and committee chairs. We excluded this component of di-
rector pay as it can vary both between directors and across time (as directors are added or 
dropped from committees). The flat pay measure is the minimum that a director will re-
ceive as a board member. 
While meeting fees and cash retainers exhibit modest increases or even decreases, the 
use of equity compensation exploded during the mid-1990s (Fich and Shivdasani, 2005). 
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We measured Contingent Pay as the value of stock and stock options granted, based on 
the value of the stock on the day of the grant, and the value of options granted annually, 
assuming the options would be exercised in 10 years (the most common exercise time pe-
riod) with 10 per cent stock appreciation. This number, as well as the value based on 5 per 
cent appreciation, is commonly reported in the proxy statements. This valuation method 
avoids the problems inherent in using Black–Scholes valuation, which requires that op-
tions terms be no longer than two years and that all options be instantly tradable (Hen-
derson, 2005) – factors that are noticeably absent for compensation options. Total Pay is 
the natural logarithm of the sum of annual flat pay and annual contingent pay. We used 
five measures to assess firm complexity. Assets is the natural logarithm of the firm’s as-
sets. Sales is the natural logarithm of annual sales. Employees is the natural logarithm of 
the number of employees in the firm. Geographic Diversification is measured as 1 minus 
the Herfindahl index of the sales reported by geographic segments, and Business Diver-
sification is measured as 1 minus the Herfindahl index of sales reported by industry seg-
ments. These two diversification measures capture the scope dimension of complexity. 
The variable Firm Complexity was created by standardizing each of these variables (mean 
of 0, standard deviation of 1), summing them and dividing the total by five. Cronbach’s al-
pha for the resulting variable was 0.836. We coded the status of existing board members 
using the same categories that were used to code the status of new board members. Cur-
rent Board Status is the number of current board members who have achieved high sta-
tus in any of the five status arenas (education, military, business, political, or community). 
Control variables. Our first control variable was Current Board Ties, which is the total 
number of ties to other corporate boards that the current board has. We controlled for 
Meetings, or the number of board meetings held during the year, as this has been used 
in previous research on director motivations as a measure of director effort (Cordeiro et 
al., 2000; Hempel and Fay, 1994). Potential directors may be influenced by the effort or 
time that they will have to spend on the job of director. We also controlled for whether the 
board has a nominating committee (Nominating Committee). The Nominating Committee 
has influence over the identification of new board members, so its existence may influence 
the type of director that joins the board. 
Instrumental variables. In our modelling, we treated Total Pay as an endogenous vari-
able since prior research demonstrates that board compensation is determined by firm at-
tributes like complexity. Thus, in order to estimate the effect of compensation, we needed 
instrumental variables that predict Total Pay but that did not expect to be related to the 
social capital of new board members. The first instrumental variable was the relative in-
dependence of the board members since boards that have more directors from outside the 
company are awarded more equity-based compensation (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). Inde-
pendence is the percentage of directors who are not insiders (directors listed in the man-
agement compensation table) or affiliated directors. We classified affiliated directors using 
SEC regulation 14A, item 6(b), where affiliated directors include relatives, customers, sup-
pliers, lawyers, and bankers (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Tihanyi et al., 2003). All other direc-
tors who are outsiders are independent outsiders. Our second  instrumental variable was 
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Board Size since it has been found to be positively associated with higher board compensa-
tion (Boyd, 1996; Hempel and Fay, 1994; Linn and Park, 2005). We controlled for the CEO 
not also serving as the chair of the board (Separate Chair) to address the influence that the 
current CEO might have on setting board compensation levels. Past performance of the 
firm was measured with Return, or the 24-month stock return. Since a part of board com-
pensation is given as stock options, increases in stock price are likely to increase total pay. 
The age of the firm may influence board compensation since older firms have different de-
mands on director effort. Firm Age is the number of years the firm has been public. Finally, 
we included dummy variables for each year to control for contemporaneous correlation. 
Table I presents a summary of our variables and their measures. 
Method 
We faced a number of methodological challenges in estimating a model to test our hy-
potheses. First, our two independent variables were simultaneously determined and were 
likely to be correlated since we hypothesized that both ties and status were attracted   by 
Table I. List of variables
Variable  Measurement
Dependent variables
   Board ties  No. of other boards on which the new director sits
   Status  Binary: = 1 if new director has status, otherwise = 0
Independent variables
   Total pay  Natural log of (Flat Pay + Contingent Pay)
   Flat pay  Sum of annual retainer and meeting fees
   Contingent pay  Value stock at issue date and value of options assuming 10   
     years of 10% appreciation
Firm complexity  Factor including the following five variables:
   Assets     Natural log of assets
   Sales     Natural log of sales
   Employees     Natural log of employees
   Geographic diversification     1 – Σs2 (s is the share of sales in each geographic segment)
   Business diversification     1 – Σs2 (s is the share of sales in each industry segment)
Current board status  No. of existing directors with status
Control variables
   Current board ties  No. of other boards on which the existing directors sit
   Meetings  No. of board meetings, annual
   Nominating committee  Binary variable, = 1 if firm has nominating committee
Instrumental variables
   Independence  % of independent outsiders on the board
   Board size  The count of the directors on the board
   Separate chair  Binary variable, = 1 if CEO is not also chair
   Return  Stock return for previous 24 months
   Firm age  No. of years since firm’s IPO
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the same firm attributes. Second, one of our independent variables (Total Pay) was shown 
in prior research to be associated with another of our independent variables (Firm Com-
plexity). Both of these problems can be addressed by estimating a system of three equa-
tions: one equation for each of our dependent variables (Board Ties and Status) and a third 
equation for Total Pay, which is an endogenous variable that is also an explanatory variable 
for the first two equations. 
Board Ties = α1 + β1X + ɛ1
Status = α2 + β2X + ɛ2
Total Pay = α3 + γZ + ɛ3
In these equations, the matrix X contains the three hypothesized variables (Total Pay, 
Firm Complexity, and Current Board Status) as well as the three control variables (Current 
Board Ties, Meetings, and Nominating Committee). The matrix Z contains these variables 
and the instrumental variables (Independence, Board Size, Separate Chair, Return, Firm 
Age, and the dummy variables for each year). We used a three-stage least squares estima-
tion technique that uses generalized least squares to correct for the correlation of the error 
terms (ɛ1, ɛ2 and ɛ3) and instrumental variables to produce consistent coefficient estimates 
with an endogenous variable. 
The three-stage least squares model corrected some of the estimation issues that we 
faced, but two additional issues were not accounted for. Our analysis focused on explain-
ing which of the directors added to boards had high social capital. In most cases, boards 
add only one new outside director in a given year, but they sometimes add two, three, or 
(in one case) four directors at a time. These are not independent events, and treating them 
as such created the potential for biased estimates. Furthermore, our two dependent vari-
ables were not continuous variables since Board Ties is a count variable and Status is a bi-
nary variable. There are panel estimation techniques that correct for potential bias created 
by non-independent observations and methods for modelling discreet dependent vari-
ables, but these methods do not work well in a system of equations that is designed to deal 
with two dependent variables and an endogenous predictor variable. As a result, in order 
to check the robustness of our three-stage least squares estimation and to understand the 
impact of these two issues on our estimation, we estimated two separate random effects 
models. To address variable discreteness, we used a negative binomial model for Board 
Ties because of the relatively low number of new director additions and a logit model for 
Status because it is a binary variable. Additionally, both of these models allow for non-in-
dependence of observations. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for all variables are presented in Ta-
ble II. On average, new directors had a total of 1.08 ties to other corporate boards and had 
high status 25 per cent of the time. Total Pay, Firm Complexity, Current Board Status, Cur-
rent Board Ties, Board Size, and Firm Age were all positively correlated with both Board 
Ties and Status. Board Independence was positively associated with Status. Separate CEO–
Chair roles were positively associated with Board Ties.    
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The log transformation of the compensation data complicates the interpretation of 
the mean, so we also provided more detail about this variable. The distribution of com-
pensation was highly skewed, with some firms giving compensation packages worth over 
$5 million and others giving only a few thousand per year; so while the median value of 
total compensation was $140,000, the average of total compensation was $370,000. The 
mean reported in the table (4.79) is the mean of the natural log of total compensation 
(in thousands) and corresponds to a total compensation of $120,000. One interesting 
thing to note is that the aggregate measures of Current Board Status and Current Board 
Ties were much more highly correlated with each other (p = 0.62) than were the individ-
ual measures of Board Ties and Status (p = 0.31). Although prior research has frequently 
treated measures of social status and board ties as components of a single construct, 
these correlations are consistent with our argument that the two constructs are distinct, 
and individual directors with either form of social capital end up on the boards of simi-
lar firms. 
We first estimated a system of equations with Board Ties and Status as the two de-
pendent variables and Total Pay as an endogenous predictor variable. We estimated 
the system of equations first with just the observations before the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
went into effect and then estimated the system of equations including the entire sample. 
There were significantly fewer new outside directors added to boards in the years after 
2002 due to fewer firms remaining in the industry and slow growth of these firms. The 
coefficient estimates from the subsample and the whole sample were very similar. These 
results are presented in Table III, and we will focus on the combined sample estimation. 
In the first equation, testing the antecedents of a new director with board ties, the coef-
ficients for Total Pay and Current Board Status were not statistically significant, so there 
was no support for Hypotheses 1a or 2a. However, the coefficient for Firm Complexity 
was positive and significant, indicating support for Hypothesis 3a (β = 0.369, p < 0.01). 
In the second equation, testing the antecedents of a new director with status, the coeffi-
cient for Total Pay was again not significant, so there was no support for Hypothesis 1b. 
The coefficients for Current Board Status (β = 0.104, p < 0.001) and Firm Complexity (β = 
0.096, p < 0.05) were both positive and significant, indicating support for Hypotheses 2b 
and 3b. The third equation was for Total Pay. While we did not develop hypotheses for 
these coefficients, it is interesting to note that these results confirm prior work by dem-
onstrating that firm complexity increases board compensation. It is also noteworthy that 
three of our instrumental variables (Independence, Return, and Firm Age) were signifi-
cant predictors of board compensation. 
As noted in the methods section, our two dependent variables were discrete rather than 
continuous variables and some firms in the sample added more than one outside director 
in a given year, so not all of the observations were independent. To see whether these is-
sues affected our results, we estimated two single-equation models. The first was a neg-
ative binomial model of Board Ties, and the second was a logit model of Status. Both of 
these models used a random effects estimator using firm-year as the panel variable. In 
other words, in cases where a firm added more than one director in a year, the model al-
lowed the error terms of these observations to be correlated. These results are presented 
in Table IV. In the model of board ties, the coefficient for Total Pay was positive and sta-
tistically significant, supporting Hypothesis 1a (β = 0.129, p < 0.05). The  coefficient for 
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Firm Complexity was also positive and significant, supporting Hypothesis 3a (β = 0.386, p 
< 0.01). The coefficient for Current Board Status was not statistically significant, so there 
was no support for Hypothesis 2a. In the model of Status, the coefficient for Total Pay was 
not significant, so Hypothesis 1b was not supported. However, the respective coefficients 
for Current Board Status (β = 0.464, p < 0.05) and Firm Complexity (β = 0.650, p < 0.05) 
were marginally significant, providing partial support for Hypotheses 2b and 3b.   
Table III. Three-stage least squares regression model of board ties and status
Variable             Pre-Sarbanes–Oxley sample     Combined sample
                                                           Estimate                      SE                       Estimate                      SE
Equation 1 – DV = Board Ties
H1a – Total Pay  -0.067  (0.115)  -0.061  (0.112)
H2a – Current Board Status  0.186†  (0.110)  0.065  (0.074)
H3a – Firm Complexity  0.410**  (0.159)  0.369**  (0.133)
Current Board Ties  0.027  (0.022)  0.046*  (0.018)
Meetings  0.037  (0.031)  0.018  (0.019)
Nominating Committee  -0.013  (0.274)  0.189  (0.130)
Constant  0.789  (0.477)  0.896  (0.505)
Equation 1 – R2  0.138  0.118
Equation 2 – DV = Status
H1b – Total Pay  0.016  (0.026)  0.023  (0.032)
H2b – Current Board Status  0.113***  (0.025)  0.104***  (0.021)
H3b – Firm Complexity  0.072*  (0.036)  0.096*  (0.038)
Current Board Ties  -0.006  (0.005)  -0.006  (0.005)
Meetings  -0.016*  (0.007)  -0.002  (0.005)
Nominating Committee  0.248***  (0.062)  0.055  (0.038)
Constant  0.123  (0.108)  0.081  (0.145)
Equation 2 – R2  0.314   0.186
Equation 3 – DV = Total Pay
Firm Complexity  0.619***  (0.142)  0.573***  (0.113)
Current Board Status  0.103  (0.108)  0.090  (0.071)
Current Board Ties  0.000  (0.022)  -0.005  (0.018)
Meetings  0.074**  (0.028)  0.030  (0.017)
Nominating Committee  1.021***  (0.268)  1.014***  (0.222)
Independence  1.683**  (0.546)  1.588***  (0.436)
Board Size  0.085  (0.061)  0.067  (0.048)
Separate Chair  0.089  (0.189)  -0.004  (0.142)
Return  0.498***  (0.115)  0.437***  (0.093)
Firm Age  -0.061***  (0.011)  -0.041***  (0.008)
Dummy Variables for Years         (included)
Constant  2.581***  (0.503)  2.887***  (0.412)
Equation 3 – R2  0.434   0.390
Observations  232   336
Standard errors in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
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Interpretation of Results 
To interpret these results, we first considered the differences between the two estima-
tion techniques and then explored the viability of alternate explanations of the results. 
Recall that the three-stage least squares estimation models Total Pay as an endogenous 
variable and allows for the simultaneous determination of the two dependent variables. 
The logit and negative binomial models did not account for these issues but better han-
dled the fact that both dependent variables were discrete as well as the potential non-in-
dependence of all the observations. Three hypothesized relationships were strongly sup-
ported; both estimation techniques provided statistically significant coefficients. Firm 
complexity was positively related to adding new directors with more ties to other boards 
(Hypothesis 3a) and adding directors with high status (Hypothesis 3b). The number of 
current board members with high status was positively related to adding directors with 
high status (Hypothesis 3b). 
The positive effect of board member compensation on the number of ties that new 
board members had (Hypothesis 1a) was only significant in the model where Total Pay 
was treated as an exogenous variable. Total Pay was significantly and positively related to 
Firm Complexity and other variables. Given the high R2 value for the equation in which To-
tal Pay was treated as endogenous, it is clearly unwarranted to assume that board member 
compensation is exogenous. We also checked whether the log transformation used to cre-
ate the Total Pay variable affected our results. When we estimated the system of equations 
using the untransformed variable, the coefficients for Total Pay were still not statistically 
significant. Thus, we must conclude that there is no support for Hypothesis 1a.  
Table IV. Single-equation models of board ties and status
Variable                                  Negative binomial model of board ties              Logit model of status
                                                          Estimate                      SE                         Estimate                       SE
H1 – Total pay  0.129*  (0.059)  0.046  (0.141)
H2 – Current board status  0.039  (0.067)  0.464*  (0.185)
H3 – Firm complexity  0.386**  (0.131)  0.650*  (0.301)
Current board ties  0.025  (0.016)  -0.024  (0.043)
Meetings  0.011  (0.016)  -0.041  (0.038)
Nominating committee  -0.156  (0.247)  2.038***  (0.608)
Independence  -0.175  (0.471)  -1.212  (1.170)
Board size  -0.084  (0.050)  0.063  (0.117)
Separate chair  0.326*  (0.154)  0.366  (0.343)
Return  0.048  (0.100)  -0.111  (0.249)
Firm age  0.002  (0.009)  -0.034  (0.020)
Dummy variables for years          (included)                                             (included)
Constant  0.194  (0.513)  -1.485  (1.139)
Observations  336   336
Standard errors in parentheses.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
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Discussion
 
Implications for Research and Practice 
Mounting empirical evidence indicates that the social capital composition of a board 
influences both board processes and board effectiveness. Recently, Haynes and Hillman 
(2010) found that the social capital of board members influences the strategic direction of 
the firm, and Hoi and Robin (2010) found that social capital can help overcome damage to 
reputation caused by accounting fraud. One might conclude from this literature that firms 
seeking board effectiveness should simply add more directors with social capital to their 
boards. We found, however, that the story is more complicated than that. Our contribu-
tion to this literature is the demonstration of firm-level antecedents to board social cap-
ital, and we thus provide some insight into why some firms end up with more directors 
with social capital than other firms. 
Our finding that more complex firms add more new directors with ties and high sta-
tus is consistent with the claim of agency theory that directors serve on boards to en-
hance their reputations as decision control experts (Fama and Jensen, 1983). As complexity 
is associated with the visibility of the firm, new directors with high social capital are at-
tracted to firms and boards that are more likely to be noticed by peers, investors, analysts, 
and other firms. Further, a complex firm is associated with a more difficult task for board 
members since firm complexity is associated with information asymmetry and a greater 
need for monitoring. Therefore, directors who join the board of a complex firm may be 
perceived as more skilled because of the greater difficulty of the director’s job as well as the 
visibility entailed in being on the board of such a firm. Thus, not only does serving on the 
board of a complex firm help enhance such a reputation because more complex firms have 
higher visibility (Ferris et al., 2003), but it also allows directors to gain expertise that can be 
transferred to other firms (Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001). 
This finding is also consistent with the idea that more complex firms more actively seek 
out new directors with social capital. Since more complex firms are more visible, they may 
see the additional benefit of having prestigious board members. More complex firms also 
face greater information asymmetry, so they may want board members who have proven 
themselves by successfully serving on the boards of other firms. Furthermore, more com-
plex firms have a wider contracting environment and are more visible, so the board ties 
and status of directors are likely to be even more advantageous for complex firms. The de-
cision to join a new board appears to be more influenced by the firm’s complexity than by 
the remuneration. This point, however, should not be taken to imply that directors are not 
influenced by pay. Prior research has shown that board member compensation influences 
whether board members attend meetings (Adams and Ferreira, 2008) and even influences 
board decisions of whether to grant stock options to the CEO (Kanagaretnam et al., 2004). 
Various countries in the European Union have conflicting guidelines regarding whether 
directors should be granted stock options (Gergory and Simmelkjaer, 2002). Our results 
suggest that such guidelines should be based on the potential impact that director com-
pensation has on board members’ decisions rather than on how compensation may attract 
better board members. Along these lines, as many directors receive significant compensa-
tion at their full time jobs, they may not be looking for significant compensation as direc-
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tors. However, given that public firms  disclose their director pay policy, there may be some 
social comparison or “keeping score.” As a result, directors can certainly be influenced by 
pay, but it may not be the primary motivator for joining a board. 
We also find that boards with high-status directors are more likely to add new board 
members with high status. The argument that individuals tend to be attracted to organi-
zations composed of people with similar social characteristics (Ashforth and Mael, 1989) 
and that this is especially true of individuals from high-status groups (Levin et al., 2002) 
is strongly reinforced in the context of boards of directors. In this case, boards that have 
high-status directors will be more interested in adding more high-status directors while 
at the same time potential high-status directors will be more attracted to those firms. 
This demonstrates what other authors have called the “Matthew effect” (Merton, 1968; 
Washington and Zajac, 2005) – the idea that social advantages tend to be perpetuated 
over time. 
A final implication of this study is that the two types of social capital that we study 
should be analyzed separately instead of combined into a single construct. Prior research 
looks at board social capital aggregated across the whole board of directors and finds high 
correlations between measures of status and ties to other firms. In our sample, we also find 
high correlation between these aggregate measures; but when we look at individual direc-
tors, the correlations are much lower. This is consistent with anecdotal observations that 
there are many board members with high status who do not serve on multiple boards and 
many individuals that serve on multiple boards who do not have high status. Our results 
suggest that the high correlation of the aggregate measures may be caused by the fact that 
directors with either type of social capital are attracted to more complex firms. The finding 
that the number of ties that the current board has is not related to new directors with ei-
ther form of social capital is further evidence that the two types of social capital are related 
but distinct constructs. 
Limitations and Future Research 
More complex firms end up with more new directors with social capital, although it 
is not clear from our analysis whether complex firms seek out new directors with social 
capital or whether directors with social capital are more attracted to more complex firms. 
However, we find no evidence in this sample that director compensation is related to add-
ing directors with social capital. Firms that are seeking a way to create advantage by add-
ing social capital to their boards, as suggested by Hillman and Dalziel (2003), will have to 
look for other ways to attract them. Future research could explore the possibility that other 
attributes, such as the social network of the CEO or the connections of large investors, can 
attract directors with social capital. If managers can figure out a way to attract directors 
with social capital, our results suggest that they may be doubly valuable because their sta-
tus can positively impact the firm and is associated with adding new directors to the board 
who have high status as well. 
In this study we find that firm complexity is a clear antecedent to new social capi-
tal on the board, and the current status of the board is positively related to the status 
of new directors. We know nothing about all of the directors that firms want or invite, 
only those who are invited and accept the invitation. Thus, we are not able to conclude 
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whether  these associations are caused by the recruiting process of boards, the decision 
process of invited board members, or some combination of the two. There are significant 
barriers to clarifying this process given the high value of confidentiality on both sides, 
but perhaps some progress could be made with confidential surveys or interviews with 
nomination committee members. 
Whatever the mechanism underlying the relationship between firm complexity and 
board social capital, the existence of firm-level antecedents to board social capital raises 
an important methodological issue. As mentioned above, numerous empirical studies 
support the idea that firms with more board social capital have better outcomes than firms 
with less. However, our results suggest a possible alternative explanation – the attributes 
that make a firm more attractive to potential board members with social capital also help 
the firm to achieve better outcomes. Studies that carefully control for the endogeneity of 
board membership are required to establish the causal direction of the relationship be-
tween board social capital and firm outcomes. 
In this study we focused on a single industry. We have already discussed the benefits 
of a one-industry study – firms within the sample are similar, so it is more plausible that 
a new board member added to one firm in the sample could be a candidate for the board 
of another firm in the sample, and the study design controls for the fact that firms in dif-
ferent industries may value status differently. Future research may be able to compare dif-
ferent industries. For example, it may be that some industries are more attractive to po-
tential directors than others. We also did not differentiate among different types of status, 
although we suspect that directors with different types of status would be attracted differ-
ently, for example, to firms in highly regulated industries or industries that are more visi-
ble such as entertainment. This appears to be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
Conclusion 
While some have suggested that social capital on the board can be valuable to the firm 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), and studies have shown that social capital can be valuable in 
various contexts (D’Aveni, 1990; Hillman, 2005; Keys and Li, 2005), we think it is impor-
tant to ask how some firms end up with more social capital on their boards than others. 
Our results indicate that firm characteristics strongly influence a firm’s ability to add new 
directors with social capital. This study contributes to the corporate governance literature 
in two main ways. First, we extend governance research by demonstrating some anteced-
ents to the board’s social capital composition. Second, we add some clarity to the study of 
board social capital not only by distinguishing between two different types of social cap-
ital but also by distinguishing between the social capital on the board as a whole and the 
social capital of individual directors. 
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